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In 1945 at the end of World War II,
the newly-founded United Nations aimed
to replace the defunct League of Nations in
ensuring world peace, security, and stability. The UN Security Council (SC) in particular was charged with the responsibility
of “maintaining international peace and security” at a time when 90% of world conflicts were fought between states. (United
Nations, 1948) (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006,
11) However, faith in the council to uphold world peace quickly subsided as the
Cold War rivalry between the U.S. and the
USSR precluded effective collaboration.
The end of the Cold War in 1989 is often cited as a turning point in history and
the beginning of a new world order. This
is clearly evidenced in the rapidly increasing rate of productivity and a newfound
spirit of cooperation in the SC. From 1991
to 1993, the Council prolifically adopted
185 resolutions, as compared to 685 in
the previous 46 years of the UN’s existence. (Malone, 2004, 6) It also launched
15 new peacekeeping operations versus 17
in the preceding 46 years. (Malone, 2004,
6) Yet as the SC became reinvigorated,
the nature of conflict had changed; 85% of
all wars fought were now intrastate wars,

many of which were ethnically and religiously driven civil wars. In 1992, the number of intrastate conflicts peaked at around
55 worldwide. (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006,
11) (Pinker, 2011, 303) These concurrent
issues have raised the following question:
how has the SC reinterpreted its mission
statement to better navigate the transition
to the post-Cold War era regarding geopolitical organization and the change in the
nature of conflict?
This paper will present three major
ways in which the SC has evolved since
the end of the Cold War. The first major
trend to be analyzed is the emergence of
the P5 (Russia, China, UK, France, US)
as a more cohesive and cooperative unit
and its implications on the changing nature of the Council’s structure and larger
mission. Next, the redefinition and evolution of the concept of sovereignty will be
highlighted in terms of the novel involvement of the SC in domestic affairs of member states. Finally, the incorporation of a
human rights discourse in the SC will be
considered both as a result of the evolving
norms in the international community and
as a consequence of the Cold War ending.

Security Council History: P5 Emergence
In the Security Council, the Cold War
ended not in 1989 but in 1986 when the
powers first found common ground regarding the renewal of Secretary General
Cuéllar’s term. Soon after, the UK representative invited the P5 to informal negotiations outside of the UNHQ in hopes
of discussing a solution to the Iran-Iraq
War. (Malone, 2004, 4) Freed from formalities, the delegates found a frank discussion
amongst themselves to be very productive,

and were able to authorize an observer
force and propose a ceasefire. USSR leader
Gorbachev’s 1998 address to the General
Assembly (GA) introduced new faith in
the council when he announced the Soviet Union would use the UN as the primary means of handling international conflicts. This implied that the USSR would
retract from its overextended commitments
throughout the world, thus marking the
end of the Cold War global rivalry. This
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Soviet strategy was reciprocated with US
cooperation in peace initiatives in Angola,
Namibia, Cambodia, and Central America, which were sites of major Cold War
proxy conflicts. (Wallensteen & Johansson,
2004, 19) The Security Council was thus
the stage for the end of the Cold War before the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
One major trend following the increase
in cooperation among the members includes the sharp decline of veto use among
the P5. During the Cold War, the use
of the veto was predictable. One camp
would propose a draft resolution that was
expected to be rejected by the opposing
side. (Wallensteen & Johansson, 2004, 20)
The veto thus gained a propagandist nature as each side accumulated political
points for its position on the resolution. After the Cold War, however, forcing fellow
council members to vote for or against a
specific resolution was viewed as “irresponsible.” (Wallensteen & Johansson, 2004,
20) While voting blocks still exist among
the P5 along certain issues (e.g. Syria,
Ukraine, Libya) member states have become more autonomous and cautious in
wielding their vote. From 1946-1995, the
veto was used a total of 244 times (approximately 29% by the U.S. and 50% by
the USSR). (Global Policy Forum, 2015)
The majority of vetoes that have been used
since the Cold War (31 from 1996-2014) relate to issues concerning one member (e.g.
Israel/Palestine for the US and Taiwan for
China) who will predictably wield its veto
alone.
The recent deadlocks among the P5
over Syria, Libya and Ukraine obscure the
overall trend of a high rate of cooperation
among the P5. Current Under-Secretary
General David Malone argues that too often one forgets “on 90% of the Council’s
agenda which are even more murderous

conflicts [than Syria, Libya, Ukraine] often in Africa, places like the Congo, the
council has no trouble agreeing.” (Malone,
March 9) In 2014 alone, the SC passed 60
out of 63 resolutions unanimously. (United
Nations Security Council, January 2015, 8)
The three aforementioned cases are nevertheless important signifiers of new trends
emerging in the Council where Russia and
China have become more vocal opponents.1
Cooperation among the P5 members of
the SC since the late 1980s has resulted
in a redistribution of tasks and prestige
once accorded to the General Assembly and
the Secretariat, that now favor the Council. During the Cold War, the GA overshadowed the deadlocked SC and even involved itself in security affairs, a duty normally reserved for the Council. In 1950,
it passed Resolution 337A: “Uniting for
Peace” which allowed the GA to consider a
resolution that was blocked by the SC due
to a lack of unanimity among the P5, and
thus act accordingly.2 (Tomuschat, 2008)
The GA has since lost influence and attention as the SC has been able to effectively
resume its duties.
The role of the Secretary-General has
also been diminished since the Cold War.
In the 1950s, SG Dag Hammarsköld played
a large role in mediating global conflicts
(e.g. sending the first UN peacekeeping
force to resolve the Suez crisis and aiding
in the Congo decolonization process) based
on the use of Article 99 of the Charter:
“the Secretary-General may bring to the
attention of the Security Council any matter in which his opinion may threaten the
maintenance of international peace and security.” (United Nations, 1948) In the postCold War period, however, the agenda for
the Council is no longer set by the Secretariat, but by the Council members themselves. The Secretariat has also been faced

1 This will be discussed at length in a later section concerning evolving conceptions of
sovereignty.
2 While it was created as a means to prevent further Soviet vetoes regarding the Korean War,
the resolution was first invoked during the Suez crisis where France and the UK had blocked any
action regarding the crisis. The measure was last invoked in 1981 to authorize economic and
diplomatic sanctions on South Africa for its illegal occupation of Namibia.
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with a strain on resources, allowing the
Council to assume a more active role in
the implementation of resolutions, a task
usually reserved for the SG.(Wallensteen &
Johansson, 2004, 21)
There has also been a structural shift
in how the Council performs its daily work.
Since the Cold War, the P5 has dominated
drafting sessions and decisions are made
more often behind closed doors during informal consultations among the P5. This
only increases the sentiment among the
rest of the council (E10) and UN members
that the SC is an “exclusive club” for the
P5. The E10 argues that the human rights
catastrophes in Yugoslavia and Rwanda relate in part to the fact that the P5 did
not disclose exclusive information regarding the conflicts with other members. In response, “Arria formula” meetings have developed, where NGO and human rights investigators are invited to brief the council.
NGO presence and lobbying of SC members have now become commonplace.
While greater cooperation among the
P5 has resulted in more innovative forms
of conflict resolution (creation of international tribunals in the former Yugoslavia,
Rwanda, and Lebanon as well as the establishment of the ICC), the role of the SC has
become more of a delegating body rather
than an enforcing power with regards to
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peacekeeping. Although the amount of
Chapter VII resolutions has multiplied following the Cold War, this has been paralleled by an increasing inability to effectively follow through with enforcement operations.(Weiss, 2004, 46) This is due to a
lack of UN funding, an inadequate military
force incapable of handling the nature of
internal conflicts, and risk-averse member
states. SC peacekeeping failures in Bosnia
and Rwanda marked the end of unilateral
UN military action.3 Instead, the Council
began to delegate the enforcement operations to regional organizations (i.e. NATO,
African Union, Arab League) and “coalitions of the willing” (i.e. Albania). Instead of being the active enforcer of world
peace and security as was envisaged in the
Charter, the SC has become a bureaucrat
worker, rubber stamping its seal of approval on operations led by other groups.
By engaging in “buck-passing,” the SC attempts to profit from immunity while minimizing costs.4 Thus while the Council has
benefited from an unprecedented rate of cooperation and effectiveness, the emergence
of the P5 has simultaneously overshadowed
the role of other UN bodies and diminished
its own role as the sole leader and enforcer
of peace and security in the world, as the
complexity of the nature of conflict necessitate burden-sharing with other regional
organizations.

The Security Council’s Changing
Conceptions of State Sovereignty
Globalization in the post-Cold War era
has eroded traditional concepts of state
sovereignty, as capital, people, ideas, and
information flow largely unhindered across
national borders. In response, the SC
has redefined its understanding of state
sovereignty and what constitutes “interna-

tional threats to peace and security,” as a
means of addressing its continuous role in
mediating conflicts despite their changing
forms. The main difference in the Council’s
conception of state sovereignty pre- versus
post-Cold War derives from a newly perceived link between domestic stability and

3 SC-sanctioned “safe zones” were unable to prevent the Srebrenica massacre in Bosnia and an
intentionally weakened force in Rwanda was not empowered to stop the genocide.
4 “Buck-passing” refers to a realist conception of strategies states employ in a multipolar world
in order to contain a rising hegemon. John Mearshimer argues that when rising states do not share
a border with great powers, the tendency to “buck-pass” increases, as the perceived threat is not
as great.(Mearsheimer, 2010)
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international security. After the Cold War,
policy makers and academics challenged
the traditional and realist means of maintaining world order with superior military
capability, deterrence, and respect for state
sovereignty. (Barnett & Weiss, 2011, 77)
The growing amount of internal conflicts
proved to have destabilizing regional and
global effects as violence often did not respect state borders or international norms
and values. Additionally, these “new wars”
shifted the understanding of civilians in
conflict zones as they were no longer casualties but deliberate targets of war.5 The
predicaments of unprecedented numbers of
refugee spillovers into neighboring countries (which doubled from 13 to 26 million
from 1987 to 1994) and the recognition that
failed states are prime breeding grounds for
terrorists convinced SC members that domestic instability is relevant to their mission of ensuring international peace and security. (Luck, 2006, 90)
The two solutions proposed by the
Council have been economic and democratic liberalization. After the Cold War,
the Council viewed democracy favorably as
it “no longer demarcated the fault line between East and West.” (Fox, 2004, 72) It
linked lack of democracy with causes of
civil wars and praised democratic governments’ abilities to engage in national reconciliation and ensure security and stable
institutions. Most importantly, the Council lauded democratic countries’ ability to
“self-police,” thus decreasing the likelihood
of a return to conflict and reducing the burden on the resource-strained UN to intervene. (Fox, 2004, 69-70) In 1993, for the
first time in UN history, the Council urged
a member state – Somalia – to transition
to democracy. It even endorsed military intervention for regime change in Haiti after
a military coup deposed the democratically

elected leader. (1994 Resolution 940)(Barnett & Weiss, 2011, 78)
All this can be explained by a theoretical shift in the conception of sovereignty
from “negative” to “positive” as defined
by international relations professor Robert
Jackson. Negative sovereignty is understood as Westphalian sovereignty where
internal matters of states are protected
from international interference. Positive
sovereignty, on the other hand, is dependent on the existence and respect of
democratic principles and rule of law in
a state. It is a “substantive rather than
a formal condition.” (Jackson, 1990, 29)
This means sovereignty is no longer an accepted protection against accusations of violations of human rights and thus validates
UN intervention in domestic affairs. Today, a state is not only expected to have
and respect a contract between the government and the people, but also a contract between the government and the international community. (Barnett & Weiss,
2011, 77) While tensions continued to surface over the relationship between state
sovereignty and the legitimate use of force
(especially in 1988 and 1999 over Iraq and
Kosovo), the overall trend in the post-Cold
War decade slowly eroded traditional conceptions of state sovereignty. The Council’s intervention in realms of traditional
state sovereignty has since become normalized; more often than not, the Council has
been criticized for its inaction with regards
to state violations of human rights rather
than for its breach of state sovereignty.
The implications of this changed conception of sovereignty can be seen in the
evolution of UN peacekeeping. While there
is no direct reference to peacekeeping in
the UN Charter, it has often been informally referred to as “Chapter VI 12 ” as it
combines elements of Chapter VI: “Pa-

5 The emergence of these “new wars” can be understood by the impact the end of the Cold War
had on the “technology of rebellion” available to rebel groups and the state.(Kalvyas & Balcells,
2010) The proliferation of small arms and the increasing emphasis of identity and ethnicity in the
conflicts also contribute to these “new conflicts”. While elements of identity and ethnicity are not
“new” causes of war, their renewed emphasis in an era of globalization and fluidity of identity as
the main motivations for war, combined with the new tools of war allows us to label these conflicts
as “new.”
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cific Settlement of Disputes” and Chapter VII: “Action with respect to threats to
the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts
of aggression.” (Luck, 2006, 37) Strategies
for building and keeping the peace have
evolved through three generations. (Doyle
& Sambanis, 2006, 11) The first generation
is understood as a force dispatched to monitor the situation after a truce has been
negotiated. A prime example is the creation of the first UN peacekeeping force in
1956 in Egypt over the Suez Crisis. This
first generation of peacekeeping has a tendency to enforce the status quo ante, which
is not suitable for internal conflicts where
the status quo ante is not accepted by the
parties and is usually the cause of the conflict. (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006, 12)
After the Cold War, the second generation of peacekeeping accorded greater
responsibility to the peacekeepers to enforce the peace including tasks for resettling refugees and overseeing the demobilization of military forces. It also added a
“peace building” dimension regarding oversight of human rights, economic rehabilitation, and organization of elections. (Doyle
& Sambanis, 2006, 11-13) This demonstrates a nuanced understanding of the
different components necessary to rebuild
the peace. Examples of second generation
peacekeeping include SC Resolution 637 in
1990 concerning El Salvador. ONUSAL
(UN Observer Mission in El Salvador) was
created and authorized by the SC with a
humanitarian mandate to oversee the human rights situation and investigate potential violations. (Weschler, 2004, 56) Thus
monitoring elections, human rights, and
reconstruction demonstrate the Council’s
evolving view of the link between democracy and conflict prevention.
Under a radically liberal interpretation of Chapter VII and conception of
sovereignty, the third generation of peace-
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keeping has allowed UN missions to operate without the consent of the country in which they are intervening. This
was designed specifically for intrastate conflicts where warring parties are not always easy to identify as “stable negotiating partners.” (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006,
11) Third generation peacekeeping operations include a wide range of activities from
protecting the delivery of humanitarian aid
to physically intervening to enforce a peace
agreement. (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006, 16)
The goal here is to force and enforce the
peace. While third generation peacekeeping gives unprecedented power and seemingly limitless options to the SC in this regard, the Council is hesitant in even threatening the use of force and usually resorts
to operations which require less military
commitment (e.g. establishment of no-fly
zones). While the Council has given itself
the tools and the widely-accepted justification on the basis of human rights to be
forceful and active in preserving the peace,
logistic realities and growing vocal RussoChinese opposition prevent the Council’s
peacekeeping activities from reaching their
full potential.
Nevertheless, the evolution of peacekeeping reflects a new vision of the UN
that is adapting to meet the different exigencies of modern conflicts. The SC has
thus reinterpreted its mandate to expand
the definition of what constitutes “international peace and security” in the post-Cold
War era after witnessing the unprecedented
repercussions of internal wars and recognizing its own inability to meet these repercussions with a traditional understanding of
sovereignty. Thus the shift in its definition
of sovereignty can be seen both as a reaction to the changed nature of conflict and
as a product of globalization which normalizes values that emphasize the importance
of democracy and respect for human rights
in relation to conflict prevention.

Human Rights Discourse in the Security Council
A third major change in the Security Council concerns the introduction of the dis-

course of human rights and its increasing
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relevance in Council affairs. While human
rights were recognized in the UN Charter
(1945) and later enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948),
the extent to which individual states were
legally obliged to protect human rights and
comply with the charter was contested and
overshadowed by a larger goal of international cooperation in the promotion of human rights. (MacFarlane & Khong, 2006,
86) Yet the human dimension of this conflict was never mentioned in SC resolutions
until the Six-Day War in 1967. (Weiss,
2004, 38) During the Cold War, great powers did not want to alienate ascending
third world members by enforcing compliance with human rights as qualifications for
membership.6 The US and USSR also did
not want these concepts to intrude on their
bid to divide the world into “spheres of influence.” (MacFarlane & Khong, 2006, 105)
The end of the Cold War, however, did
not bring about an automatic transition
to championing human rights in the Security Council. Rather, it was a gradual process of selectively and inconsistently invoking human rights language to justify resolutions. In January 1992, at the Council member summit to address “expanding horizons,” humanitarian concerns were
not seen as a primary responsibility of the
Security Council, but were characterized
as a vague responsibility for “the United
Nations membership as a whole, working
through the appropriate bodies”. (Luck,
2006, 84) SG Boutros Boutros-Ghali (19921996) rarely addressed the issue of human rights, and when he did, he expressed the belief that it was an internal matter. (Weschler, 2004, 63) The failures of the SC in Bosnia and Rwanda as
well as the NATO intervention in Kosovo
without SC authorization called for a reconceptualization of UN humanitarian in-

tervention and peacekeeping. Part of this
new thinking evolved outside of the Council. SG Kofi Annan (1997-2006) incorporated human rights into his agenda and emphasized their importance and relevance to
all UN matters. The concept of “human security” was also first mentioned in the “Human Development Report of 1994,” which
called for an expansion of the definition of
international security that specifically factored in the human element.7 In a delayed fashion, the Security Council adopted
the trend of human rights discourse that
was already prevalent in other UN bodies.
When Canada assumed the presidency of
the Security Council in February 1999, it
actively placed human rights at the forefront of the agenda of the Council. (MacFarlane & Khong, 2006, 175) The following
year, the SC passed Resolution 1296 which
stated:
deliberate targeting of civilian populations or other protected persons
and the committing of systematic,
widespread and flagrant violations of
international humanitarian and human rights law in situations of armed
conflict may constitute a threat to international peace and security, and
in this regard, [the SC] reaffirms its
readiness to consider such situations
and, where necessary, to adopt appropriate steps. (MacFarlane & Khong,
2006, 175-176)
While the Council had finally expanded
its definition of what constituted international security to include the human element, the language of the resolution still
remained cautious and hesitant.
Nevertheless, this resolution set a
precedent for the concept of “Right to
Protect” (R2P), developed in 2001 and
adopted in 2005 by the GA. Coined by
the ICISS (International Commission on

6 These new members were also suspicious of acts that would reduce their newly attained
sovereignty.
7 “the concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory
from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of a nuclear holocaust. It has been related more to nation states than to
people.”(United Nations Development Programme, 1994)
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Intervention and State Sovereignty), R2P
attempts to reconcile national sovereignty
and ethical humanity. (Doyle, 2015, xi)
This changed the nature of the debate
from the right of powers to invade, to
the rights of “affected populations to assistance and protection” and the obligation of
the international community to heed those
calls. (Weiss, 2004, 41) In 2005, the GA
limited legitimate intervention to: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity,
and ethnic cleansing. (Doyle, 2015, 112)
Both China and Russia – staunch
supporters of traditional “negative”
sovereignty—expressed their cautious approval of this evolution of sovereignty. For
liberal theorists like John Ikenberry, the
fact that China especially no longer maintains the rigid conception of sovereignty
to which it once held firm, demonstrates
the effective integration of China into the
international system and an internalization of accepted norms.8 China agreed to
R2P only when it was assured that it could
only be applied with the approval of the
Council, which would serve as a check to irresponsible use of the doctrine. (Ferdinand,
n.d., 4) This can be seen as a step towards
the reconciliation of China’s role in global
governance and its traditional doctrine on
state sovereignty. R2P has symbolized the
evolution of what are deemed appropriate
interventions. The normalization of R2P
language even has the potential to be considered an official part of international law
rather than a non-binding GA proposal.
Yet the normalization of R2P potentially borders on abuse when used as a justification for intervention beyond humanitarian concerns. The use of R2P in 2011 regarding Libya and the debacle that ensued
following allegations of NATO overstepping its SC mandate has produced unan-
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ticipated backlash from the P5 members
who abstained from the resolution (China
and Russia). R2P was invoked in response
to the crackdown of former Libyan leader
Gaddafi on “freedom fighters” and out of
fear that he was preparing for a “bloodbath”. (Kuperman, 2013, 108) Unlike previous cases in which R2P was invoked (e.g.
SC Resolution 1674 on Darfur in 2006),
it was the threat of mass violence rather
than the violence itself, which justified the
use of the doctrine. After the mandate expired and chaos in Libya ensued, NATO
was accused of “mission creep” by pursuing regime change rather than protection
of the people.9 (Kuperman, 2013, 113-115)
Ikenberry’s firm belief in the strength of
institutions does not account for this possibility of the delegitimization of institutions (in the eyes of weaker or rising states
in the system such as Russia and China)
that could occur when the SC undertakes
or approves such actions, thus facilitating the collapse of the delicate balance of
“strategic restraint.” Traces of this breakdown in cohesion can be seen as Russia and
China consequently became more resolute
and vocal when expressing their views in
the SC. When it came to subsequent resolutions concerning the Syrian regime’s crackdown on protesters later in the year, Russia
and China no longer expressed their hesitance by abstaining, but were more explicit
in their opposition by vetoing four subsequent resolutions that aimed to condemn
the Syrian regime. This shows not only a
return to their previous convictions in upholding “negative” sovereignty, but it also
expresses a more self-confident approach in
opposing Western discourse due to recent
increases in both countries’ economic and
political significance. This NATO intervention could potentially have future im-

8 This supports Ikenberry’s belief in institutions and the power of “strategic restraint” whereby
great powers are bound by rules and norms, and weaker and rising states like China are incentivized to abide by the world order by acquiring economic and political benefits and prestige.
(Ikenberry, 2008)
9 It could be argued that NATO’s actions did not serve to protect civilians, but promote regime
change. Kuperman claims NATO attacked many government forces in areas that did not represent
a threat to Libyan civilians either because they supported the regime or were retreating and thus
not attacking civilians.
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plications for the UN’s repeated “outsourcing” of SC enforcement, thus raising the

question of where ultimate responsibility
lies when plans go awry.

Conclusion: Prospects for Security Council Reform
The Security Council has significantly
evolved following the Cold War in adapting a humanitarian discourse, negotiating
a new definition of sovereignty, and changing its approach to peacekeeping and conflict resolution missions to suit the “new”
nature of conflict. The emergence of the
P5 has also concentrated power and authority from different UN institutions into
this select group of Council members. P5
members are increasingly perceived as an
archaic group unrepresentative of today’s
great powers and thus unsuited as the sole
leaders of the Council. Proposals for Council reform vary from G4 to Models A/B to
the Italian model and have only increased
in recent decades.10 While the proposed
models take a step towards representational equity, their reliance on Euro-centric
regional groupings or disproportionate continental groups highlight the difficulties of
fairly representing the current global order.
A successful reform model must take
into account the changing role of the
SC. Consequently, those nations who contribute the most to the ever-increasing SCsanctioned peacekeeping missions (which
are mostly developing nations), should
have a greater say in the Council regarding the nature of their commitments. The
reform model should also consider not only
geographical representation, but also economic representation. Those who hold
more economic weight, as well as those who
contribute the most in terms of financial

resources to the UN should have greater
access to the Council. Lastly, SC reform
cannot be effectively addressed without resolving the question of veto power. Increasing non-permanent or permanent representation does not change the fact of the
P5 veto, which many view as illegitimate.
While increased veto power might create
more inefficiency in the Council in terms
of preventing discussion on topics that are
sensitive to the new veto-wielding states’
national interests, abolishing it altogether
would create its own problems. Even if this
scenario is hard to imagine as the veto is
fiercely protected by the P5, the removal
of veto power could reduce the incentive
for the major powers to stay in the organization. Ultimately, reform needs to be
flexible and amendable for further future
shifts in global political and economic orders.
Perhaps lessons from the gradual postCold War transition of the SC can shed
light on the nature of the transition towards future reform of the Council. If so,
reform will likely also follow a painfully
slow process in relation to the evolving
world, but the Council will eventually find
a means to reconcile tradition and modernity. If it fails to do so, the Council risks
losing all legitimacy as regional organizations become more empowered to act on
issues of international security and bypass
the UN, thus creating a similar pre-WWII
skeletal system of authority in matters concerning international peace and security.

10 The 2005 G4 (India, Germany, Brazil, Japan) each request permanent seats on the Council.
Models A and B were both proposed by former SG in 2005. Model A advances the suggestion of
adding six permanent seats (without veto power) distributed among Africa (2) Asia and the Pacific
(2) Europe (1) and Americas (1) and three additional non-permanent seats. Model B propose a
new group of eight 4-year renewable term seats (2 each for Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Europe,
and the Americas) and one non-permanent seat. All proposals have only ever gained at most vocal support by P5 members, but have never been explicitly approved.(Hoffman & Ariyoruk, May
2005)
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